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Abstract—This paper deals with the crucial challenging issue
of testing the conformance of the MANET routing protocols.
Indeed, because of the inherent constraints of such networks
such as a dynamic topology, to formally test these protocols
becomes a tough problem. Most of the studies taking into account
a formal model of the protocol is faced to the combinatorial
state space explosion issue when deploying and analyzing that
model. In our work we present how to cope with that problem by
drawing inspiration of the model-checker research domain and
an integration of a component-based testing algorithm dedicated
to the automatic generation of OLSR test sequences from a
formal model written in Promela.
Index Terms—MANET, Routing Protocols, Conformance Test-
ing, Model-checker, SPIN.
I. INTRODUCTION
A wireless mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a collection
of mobile nodes that communicate each other. This kind
of network is self-organizing and does not depend on any
predefined infrastructure neither centralized administration.
By this way, the network may rapidly be deployed. Every
node participates to the communication establishment as well
reliable operations. Nevertheless, the nodes movement may
lead to a volatile topology providing then numerous intercon-
nections. Since the network is infrastructureless, some of the
nodes have to behave as routers by interacting using their radio
range with open transmission medium in order to establish
end-to-end communications. Therefore, due to the inherent
constraints of such networks as well the limited resources of
the nodes, reliable and efficient routing protocols are needed
leading then to the challenging issue of testing the MANET
routing protocols.
Many protocols to route the packets through a MANET have
now been proposed and several implementations have been
provided. Besides, many works proposing testing techniques
have been published. However, most of them are related with
simulation or emulation testbeds in order to check performance
aspects of these protocols. Very few of them take into ac-
count their functional properties as well by applying formal
approaches. But as established in [1], simulators such as NS-2
may contain erroneous implementations (in their case AODV)
on which many studies are based, illustrating by this manner
that formal testing techniques are crucial to test such routing
protocols.
From that observation, conformance testing techniques that
ensure correct protocol implementations have become more
and more essential for the development of reliable commu-
nicating systems. Due to the complexity to test the systems
whose the size becomes huge, the designers use some mod-
ularity concepts to model them. Indeed, in many cases and
more specifically with the formal model of a MANET whose
the topology may be often modified, the analysis of its formal
specification may be difficult failing to reach a test objectives
and then to generate the test sequences.
That is why component-based testing approach has become
a main research area. Its main goal is to generate test se-
quences for a component embedded in a whole system. The
techniques are known for several years now [2], [3] but the
constraints occurring when testing a MANET routing protocol
lead most of the times to the combinatorial explosion of
the model [4]. That is why some efforts have been done to
combine techniques provided by both the testing and model-
checking communities.
A. Related Works
Although there are many works about testing and verify a
MANET [5], from our knowledge, there is no publication on
the generation of test sequences from the model of a MANET
routing protocol by using model-checking techniques. Never-
theless, we may cite the following works from which we draw
inspiration.
For instance, the authors of [6] propose to use the model-
checker SPIN [7] in order to automatically generate regression
tests. The technique is dedicated to the test of software.
Nevertheless, the case study as well the model is very simple
and since the model-checker is not modified, the approach is
not scalable. In [8], the model-checker Blast is applied [9].
This latter has been modified in order to generate test suites
guaranteeing a full coverage of the software. Nevertheless,
in this approach no formal specification is performed and it
is much more dedicated to the software testing rather than
to the routing protocol one. Indeed, it seems difficult with
that technique to observe or control (as needed in a testing
architecture) interfaces between some protocol layers.
The same issues are met with the work presented in [10].
The authors apply the Nu-SMV model-checker [11] in order
to test the conformance of different kinds of interfaces of
Web Services. They use unit and integration testing technique
through interfaces between the formal specifications and the
data flow. However for a MANET routing protocol, the spec-
ification represents several different topologies and to access
interfaces embedded in a wireless and mobile node may be
difficult. Another interesting work is the one published by
Heimdahl et al. [12] where several case studies are analyzed
through the application of Nu-SMV. The approach is inter-
esting and original providing relevant results but the model
can not contain any variables which significantly reduce the
usability in the MANET because of the packet exchanges as
well the important flows.
In this paper we cope with these constraints and bridge the
existing gap in order to automatically generate test sequences
for the conformance of the routing protocols in a MANET.
B. Contributions of this Paper
• While most of the works on MANET routing protocol
testing is performed through simulator and emulator, we
apply a formal testing approach based especially on the
automatic generation of test scenarios from a formal
model.
• Taking into account the IETF RFC, we specified a formal
model of the OLSR protocol [13] in Promela [14] allow-
ing to provide an OLSR network containing any number
of nodes (because of the instantiation of a node process).
• Due to the mobility of the nodes, most of the common
testing techniques are irrelevant for the MANET. We
draw therefore inspiration from model-checking methods
where deployed state compression techniques are reliable.
• We adapt the model-checker SPIN with an efficient gen-
eration testing algorithm by developing a tool prototype.
Indeed, as mentioned above, several studies tackled that
problem but no one applied a component-based testing
approach to a model-checker in order to take into account
the inherent constraints of a MANET and then avoid the
state space explosion issue.
• We automatically generate test sequences for some OLSR
test objectives showing by the way that our adaptation is
more efficient in some cases than the originating model-
checker.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the
Section II, we present the main characteristics of OLSR, the
concept of component-based conformance testing, the OLSR
formal model as well the language utilized to specify the
protocol and the SPIN model-checker. Then our test sequence
generation approach is illustrated in the Section III. In the
Section IV, OLSR test objectives are defined and designed
from which test sequences are generated by SPIN and our tool.
We comment the results in the Section IV-B before concluding
in Section V.
II. OLSR COMPONENT-BASED TESTING
This section introduces the protocol OLSR on which our ex-
periments are conducted. We define the concept of component-
based conformance testing, present the SPIN model-checker
and illustrate the Promela model of OLSR.
A. The Optimized Link State Routing Protocol
The Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR) [13] is
a proactive protocol that needs to react quickly to topology
changes and find alternative paths consequently. For that
purpose, it maintains several routing tables and exchanges
topology information between nodes of the network. OLSR
uses specialized aggregation nodes in order to reduce the
number of packets used in the flooding of neighborhood
information. These nodes are the Multipoint Relay (MPR).
They are selected as MPR by some neighbor nodes and
they announce periodically the topology information through
Topology Control (TC) messages to the nodes which have
selected it as MPR. In route calculation the MPR are also
used to form the route from a given node to any destination
in the network.
B. Component-based Conformance Testing
Conformance testing establishes the conformance of an
implementation to its specification. In other words, confor-
mance testing is devoted to the implementation behaves as it
is expected by the specification. Commonly, specification is
used to generate the tests for observable interactions of the
implementation. Those tests are then executed against the real
implementation and we observe if the outputs of this one are
the expected ones. Accordingly, a verdict is emitted, a PASS
when the outputs are those expected, a FAIL in the other case
and an INCONCLUSIVE when non determinism is observed.
In case of component-based testing, the accent is put on
the interactions of a particular implementation component
in the context of the other components. This kind of test
is also known as embedded component testing. Indeed, no
direct access is given to the component to be tested. To
perform component testing, a method is needed to drive the
derivation of tests, i.e., to reach in the whole specification the
transitions of the component to be tested. In our methodology,
the component is characterized by its behavior in terms of in-
teraction with its environment. The behavior of the component
is expressed as test objectives to cover.
C. Promela and the Model-Checker SPIN
Promela (PROcess MEta LAnguage) [14] is the modeling
language supported by the model-checker tool SPIN. Promela
is a high-level description language derived from the C lan-
guage to specify communication systems. In Promela, system
components are described as processes that can interact either
by message passing, via channels, or memory sharing via
global variables. The communication can be synchronous or
asynchronous. Processes specify behavior of the concurrent
entities of the distributed system. These processes can be
instanciated such that wireless mobile nodes may be obtained
from a single process. Channels and global variables define
the environment in which the process run.
SPIN can be used for formal verification of distributed
communication systems. The system description is given in
Promela and requirements to be verified can be directly
written as assertions in the code or by specifying properties
as formulas in propositional linear temporal logic PLTL [15].
SPIN works on-the-fly, it means that the tool does not need
to construct the complete state space to verify a property;
instead it is done dynamically during processing. SPIN pro-
vides abstraction techniques such as states fusion, partial order
reduction or BDD-like storage techniques.
D. Formal Model of OLSR
To generate the tests, we first need to model in a formal way
the protocol. OLSR was specified in Promela which can be
viewed as a transition system. This choice has been motivated
especially because of the efficient model-checker SPIN and the
existing related works. Our specification is devoted to the test
of the OLSR implementation embedded in one single node in
the context of other OLSR nodes. Besides, we need to take
into account the constraints inherent to such networks.
We have to consider the mobility of nodes, the broadcast-
ing of control messages such as HELLO messages and the
dynamic modifications of the topology. These aspects raise
challenges for the modeling. In our specification, we have
made some choices:
• Broadcast: In our specification, broadcast is specified by
unicasting the packets to every node taking into account
a matrix of connectivity. By unicasting we mean that
all packets are sent before enabling any other action. In
Promela, the messages are sent to all neighbors through
channels associated to the nodes.
• Connectivity: In our specification, the communications
between the nodes are specified in using a dynamic matrix
(the number of nodes varies), symmetrical of size N×N
where N is the node number in our network. The matrix
is symmetrical because we suppose that all links are
bidirectional. This assumption allows to rapidly observe
the routes creation and the packets sending as well.
Nevertheless, unidirectional links are easily specifiable
in using an asymmetric matrix. In addition, in order to
reduce the complexity, we suppose that the nodes are
connected or not connected (1 or 0 in the matrix). We
do not design intermediate state connection as we could
have with the protocols of the lower layers (link/MAC).
Indeed, our objective is the test of routing functionalities
and not the physical or link layer studies. We use a global
variable MaxNodes that instantiates the maximum number
of nodes to be created.
• Topology: The topology can change in the specification
by applying modification on the connectivity matrix ei-
ther manually in having beforehand chosen the different
moves of the nodes, or randomly.
To cope with a reasonable model, we did some abstractions.
First, we do not consider the extensions that are mentioned
for IPv6, we only consider IPv4. To simplify, we also do
not take into account the HNA (Host Network Association)
which is used to have a link to the other networks. We
have also simplified the number of interfaces of each node
by considering a node with a single interface characterizing
its main address. Short pieces of the OLSR specification are
illustrated by the Part 1 and Part 2 of Section IV-A.
III. COMPONENT TESTS GENERATION AND SPIN
MODEL-CHECKER ALGORITHMS
In this section, we present an embedded test generation
method, the Hit-or-Jump (HoJ) algorithm [16] which is inte-
grated into the model-checker SPIN [7]. The integration of our
algorithm in the SPIN tool permits to obtain a guided random
walk to generate OLSR test sequences. We propose a new
algorithm to adapt the acceptance cycle detection algorithm
of SPIN by using the HoJ method. Test objectives are used to
describe finite behavior and accept state detection algorithm.
A. Outline of the HoJ Algorithm
The HoJ algorithm [16] introduced in SPIN allows to cover
all the interactions of the component in its context. The essence
of our approach is as follows. At any moment, we conduct
a local search from the current state in a neighborhood of
the deployed Promela transition system. If an untested part
of the component is found (a Hit, i.e., an interaction that has
to be tested), we keep it for the final test sequence, and then
continue the search process from there. Otherwise, we move
randomly to the frontier of the neighborhood searched (Jump),
and resume the process from there. This procedure avoids the
building of a whole system accessibility graph. Accordingly,
the space required is determined by the user, e.g., a depth
limit or a maximum number of states, and it is independent of
the system under consideration. On the other hand, a random
walk may get trapped at certain part of the component under
test [17]. Our algorithm is designed to jump out of the trap
and pursue the exploration further. We build at each step a
partial accessibility graph to avoid the state-number explosion
problem mentioned before. The algorithm finally produces a
test sequence as a transition tour of the component in its
context.
B. SPIN and HoJ integration
SPIN considers undesirable properties to be checked, which
are defined either by Promela never claims (i.e., temporal
claims) or directly by a PLTL formula. SPIN transforms the
claim in a Bchi automaton and computes the synchronous
product of this automaton with the Bchi automaton of the
system (i.e., the Promela model). It means that the intersection
of these both automata languages is produced providing then
a scenario illustrating what should never happen.
In our method, the test objectives (i.e., the transitions of the
component to be covered) describe a finite desirable behavior.
Therefore, by considering the negation of these objectives (a
set of propositions (i.e., boolean expressions) on the system
states) and by processing the above mentioned product, we
provide a test sequence related to the test objectives.
To control the system execution, a synchronous product of
the sequence specified in the temporal claim with the inter-
leaving sequences specified in the OLSR Promela model is
provided. This synchronous product is a new Bchi automaton
in which every state is defined as a pair (s, n) where s
is a state from the system automaton, and n a state from
the never claim. Every transition in the new automaton is
defined by a pair of transitions (a, p), where a is an action
of the system, and p a proposition of the never claim. This
transition can only occur if the proposition p is valid in s (i.e.,
the source state of the transition). Note that an accept state
(s, n) is a state of the product automaton where s is a state
that corresponds to an uncovered component transition of the
system and n is a state of the claim automaton where a marked
proposition (by an accept label) is reached. Instead of seeking
an acceptance cycle as done in the nested depth-first search
(NDFS) algorithm of SPIN, our method search a path (without
cycles) going from the initial state of the product automaton
to the stop state (s, n) where n is a final state of the claim
automaton. This path must contains all the accept states of the
product automaton.
C. Accept State Detection Algorithm
As above mentioned, the main goal is to reach a stop state
of the synchronous product automaton. During this depth-
first search (DFS), all the accept states (describing the test
objectives) must be reached (cf. Figure 2). If a depth limit d
(defined by the user) is reached from a current state (initialized
to the initial state in line 1 of Figure 1) without detecting an
accept state or stop state, a jump of depth d is carried out by
building a partial search tree and by choosing uniformly and
randomly a leaf node of this tree (cf. lines 16–20 in Figure 1).
This tree has as root the current state and also has a depth
d. The selected leaf node will be the new current state (as
in line 21). From this later state, a new partial search (of
an accept state or stop state) is performed (as in line 22).
The algorithm terminates when a stop state is reached or
when the complete exploration of the state space is performed
(cf. line 7). Finally, the obtained path from the initial state to
the stop state, which contains all the accept states constitutes
the test sequence. The algorithm is depicted in the Figure 1
and illustrated by the Figure 2.
D. The Formulation of Test Objectives
The SPIN tool accepts correctness properties expressed in
PLTL or directly in Promela never claim. In SPIN, the never
claim must express a negative property. In our component test
generation method, we use the never claim to describe the test
objectives that model the OLSR component transitions to be
tested. These test objectives describe finite desirable behaviors.
Their formulation consists of a set of logical propositions on
the model state which can correspond to the triggering of
transitions or to the evaluation of variables. Every proposition
✄
1 current_state := initial_state;
2 dfs (current_state);
3
4 proc dfs(s)
5 if not(depth_limit reached) then
6 add(s) to stateSpace;
7 if stop(s) then report testSequence; exit();
8 else if accept(s) then current_state := s; fi
9 fi
10 for each(selected) successor s1 of s do
11 if (s1 not in stateSpace) then
12 add transition(s,s1) to
reachedTransitions;
13 dfs (s1);
14 fi
15 od
16 else if (s = current_state) then
17 Build from s a partial exploration tree having
depth limit;
18 Choose uniformly and randomly a leaf node of
this tree;
19 Initialize the partial stateSpace;
20 Update stateSspace, transitionsTable and
testSequence;
21 current_state := leafNode
22 dfs (leafNode);
23 fi
24 end dfs.
✂ ✁
Fig. 1. Accept State Detection Algorithm
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Fig. 2. Accept State Detection with HoJ
is marked by an accept label. We give below an example of
a never claim with one accept label (i.e., accept prop1 in
line 6 of the following claim) that identifies where the test
objective holds. The never claim is noted ¬(⋄ prop1) in PLTL.
In PROMELA, it is noted as in the following:
✄1 never {
2 do
3 :: skip
4 :: prop1 −> break
5 od
6 accept prop1: skip
7 }
✂ ✁
The loop is left when all the propositions (i.e., test objec-
tives) are checked in order to finally reach the final state of the
never claim. For our experiments on OLSR (see Section IV),
we need to define a never claim with several accept label that
mark a set of propositions.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Our experiments have been performed with a Processor Intel
Pentium 4 (CPU 2.4GHz, RAM 512MB, Cache size 512 MB).
The OLSR test sequences have been generated both by SPIN
and our prototype tool based on the model-checker in which
HoJ has been integrated, allowing then to compare the results.
A. OLSR Test Objectives
This section presents some examples of test objectives
formulation. For sake of simplicity, we only detail four OLSR
properties. The experiments are performed on a network
modeled with five nodes moving randomly. We nevertheless
assume that this random topology allows to observe the
following properties especially to generate the respected test
sequences. We formalize the test objectives for the node n1.
• Test Objective 1: To test the asymmetric link process.
A node n1 sends a HELLO message to its neighbors.
Then, it can declare that it has an asymmetric link with
a node if this node sends back a HELLO message with
the source n1 added in its ASYM set.
• Test Objective 2: To test the symmetrical link process.
A node n1 which has already a asymmetrical link with a
node n2, can declare to have a symmetrical link with n2
if it sends a HELLO message saying to n1 that it has a
symmetrical link with him.
• Test Objective 3: To test that only a node that is
established as a MPR can send TC messages (see Figure
3).
• Test Objective 4: To test that a HELLO message is sent
after a Hello interval.
n2n1
HELLO ( n1, MPR_neigh, SYM_Link, n2)
TC (n1)
Fig. 3. MSC of the test objective 3
To perform our test generation, we express these test ob-
jectives inside the never claim. We identify in the formal
specification, the component involved in the design of the test
objectives. For that purpose, we label in the specification the
transitions to be reached. These transitions will belong to the
test sequence.
In order to generate the test sequence for the test objective
1, we put two (control-flow) labels in the specification, one in
the HELLO message generation part (cf. label L0 in line 4 of
the Part 1) and a second in the part devoted to the classification
of the links (cf. label L1 line 8 of the Part 2). We show below
how the labels L0 and L1 are put on the Promela specification.
✄
1 do
2 ::( i<NODES)−> if
3 :: (Node_1[id].Node_2[i] == UNSPEC_LINK) −> skip;
4 :: else −> L0 : Ch[i] ! HELLO_MESSAGE,sendMe;
5 fi ; i++;
6 :: else −> break;
7 od;
✂ ✁
Part 1: Promela Specification of HELLO Message
Generation with the Label L0
✄
1 inline calculLinkType(indice, linkCode_LT) {
2 if
3 :: ((LinkSet[indice].L_SYM_time.sec > timer.sec) ||
((LinkSet[indice].L_SYM_time.sec == timer.sec)
&& (LinkSet[indice].L_SYM_time.msec >=
timer.msec)))
4 −> linkCode_LT = SYM_LINK;
5 :: else −>
6 if
7 :: ((LinkSet[indice].L_ASYM_time.sec > timer.sec)
|| ((LinkSet[indice].L_ASYM_time.sec ==
timer.sec) &&
(LinkSet[indice].L_ASYM_time.msec >=
timer.msec)))
8 −> linkCode_LT = ASYM_LINK; L1 : skip;
9 :: else −> linkCode_LT = LOST_LINK;
10 fi ;
11 fi ;
12 }
✂ ✁
Part 2: Promela Specification of Links Classification with
the Label L1
In this test objective 1, first a HELLO message has to be sent
from n1 to n2 (cf. label L0 of the Part 1), then n2 receives it,
answers and n1 classifies its link to this node as asymmetric
(cf. label L1 of the Part 2). Two steps are needed in the never
claim and two global variables are defined as it follows:
✄
1 #define p1 (Node[1]@L0)
2 #define p2 (Node[1]@L1)
✂ ✁
Note that the variable p1, for instance, takes the value true
if its associated process instance (Node[1]) is currently in
the state marked by L0 which is the first step of the test
objective 1. Let checked be an array of boolean indexed by
the boolean variables p1, p2 such that checked(p1) = true
meaning as an example that the variable p1 takes true at
least once. These boolean variables p1, p2 are used in the
design of the test objective 1. Its associated never claim is de-
scribed by the two propositions: prop1 = p1∧¬checked(p1);
prop2 = p2∧¬checked(p2)∧ checked(p1). The never claim
of the test objective 1 is described as follows:
✄1 never {
2 do
3 :: skip
4 :: prop1 −> checked(p1) = true;
5 :: prop2 −> checked(p2) = true; break;
6 od
7 accept objective1 : skip
8 }
✂ ✁
The never claim of the test objective 1
B. Results and Discussions
This section presents a comparative table (see Figure I)
between the results obtained by the original SPIN and by our
own prototype for the OLSR protocol in the same context.
We have exercised our method to test a specific node in the
context of four other nodes. The test objectives are expressed
in order to cover some OLSR properties. We compared the
stored states number (in data structures) and the stored or
matched transitions number.
We note that for the two tools (SPIN and our own pro-
totype), we obtained the same test sequence with the same
depth. We did not try to obtain different test sequences by
changing the depth of search. Our objective is to achieve to
reach the transitions in the OLSR Promela model. We can
notice that for the MPR with the SPIN tool, we did not achieve
to reach the test objective related to the computation of the
MPR. Nevertheless, with our prototype we obtain a result for
this test objective. We can explain these results by our efficient
strategy to explore the system. Indeed, we can get out a part
of the specification that is not relevant for our search with
the jump strategy. SPIN DFS carries out a back-tracking if
the maximum search depth is reached without reaching an
accept state or a stop state. Indeed, a maximal depth limit is
predefined and the value is high.
On the contrary, our prototype works on partial graph and
traverses shortest path due to the small depth limit set to
obtain a jump. In this case we only back-track to the root node
of the partial graph (i.e., current state) and executes a jump.
Moreover, the jump allows us to get out the trap and to search
our test objectives in other part of the graph. We can avoid
very long test sequences with uninteresting paths according
to a good depth search choice. To explain more precisely
the MPR test objective, we have to say that the other test
objectives are related to a subset of nodes as these properties
are computed locally for a node. On contrary, for the property
of MPR, the computation are done for all the nodes of the
network, there is no knowledge a priori of which node can be
computed as MPR. The flooding of HELLO messages and the
classification of links are performed for all the neighborhood.
This computation can explain the state space explosion even
if the network is reduced to five nodes. With our modified
version of SPIN, we obtain a result after a jump. In that work,
we generated the test sequences related to OLSR properties.
Since they were provided from a Promela model, they are
represented as input/outputs sequences. Therefore, a following
work is to formulate them in a executable manner and to apply
them on a real implementation under test of OLSR as it is
mentioned in a previous work [18] in which we define testing
architectures.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper discussed a new approach to generate test cases
for an embedded component, which is a MANET routing
protocol. This method conducts a search in the partial product
of the whole formally specified OLSR system and the automa-
ton of the formula that represents the test objectives, i.e., the
transitions of the component to cover.
We have implemented inside the model-checker SPIN an
efficient testing algorithm that allows to avoid the state space
explosion. Therefore, through an OLSR specification written
in Promela, we have exercised our prototype against SPIN.
While the results are quite similar if the component to reach
is not so deep into the model (that is, it does not need an
important testing coverage), they differ when many interac-
tions between the nodes are needed to observe a test objective.
Indeed, our approach may take into account the dynamic
topology of MANET networks and then provides test verdicts
whereas this is not the case for the model-checker.
An immediate line of future is to exercise our prototype
with different criteria of coverage. We present in the paper
a coverage criterion that is the transitions coverage in order
to produce a transitions tour of the component in its context.
This criterion can be rapidly changed, may one want only to
test some critical functionalities of a module. Specifically, it
would help to test the scalability of our approach with dozen of
nodes. Besides, it will be interesting to validate our approach
through complex OLSR testing objectives. For that aspect,
requirements such as HNA and two OLSR interfaces should
be added to the formal model.
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